



SECRET ENCLOSURES  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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April 13, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. A. J. GOODPASTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Position Papers for Foreign Ministers'  
Conference, Washington, April, 1960

Enclosed for your information is a selection of position papers prepared for use during the present conference of Foreign Ministers. Of particular interest to you will be "Summit Keynote - Talking Paper for the Secretary," FMW TP-1/1, April 9, 1960. You will recall that I sent you the substance of this paper on March 27 - it was in the form of a Dear Harold letter. As you know the President approved this paper for use at this meeting as well as for his own use at the Summit. Also of interest is the Scope and Objectives paper (D-0/3) which gives an outline of the substance of the conference.

John A. Calhoun  
Director  
Executive Secretariat



Enclosures:

1. Scope and Objectives,  
FMW D-0/3.
2. Summit Keynote,  
FMW TP-1/1.
3. Germany Including Berlin,  
FMW D-2/1.
4. Disarmament, FMW D-3/1a.
5. East-West Relations  
General Aspects, Including  
Statement of Principles,  
FMW D-4/6.

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FMW D-O/3

April 10, 1960

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING  
Washington, D.C., April 12-14, 1960

Position Paper

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES  
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING



1. Object of the Meeting

The U.S. objective at the forthcoming meeting will be to ensure that those decisions on summit preparations which can be taken at this stage are made and that guidance is provided for the next phase of summit preparations.

a. The Ministers will be called upon to make decisions on a number of specific problems concerning future summit preparations and summit procedures. These questions are described in the two papers on these subjects.

b. It would also be useful for the Foreign Ministers to have a general discussion on the Western approach to the summit in the first (tripartite) session (the same ground would presumably also be covered in abbreviated form in subsequent sessions).

c. The Foreign Ministers will be called upon to attempt to resolve some of the outstanding differences in the three fields into which summit preparations have been divided: Disarmament, Germany including Berlin, and East-West Relations, where possibly the greatest divergences are to be found.

2. General Soviet Position and Tactics at the Outset of the Conference

It would be useful to attempt to arrive at a tentative consensus among the Foreign Ministers as to general Soviet foreign policy aims at this time. The following analysis is suggested as a basis of discussion:

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We see no basic change in Soviet aims or long-range intentions as they have been understood by Western leaders. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders apparently continue to desire to consolidate and expand the Soviet system by any means which will not jeopardize their home base in the Soviet Union. For the moment, this consideration rules out deliberate resort to all-out war, and we must try to ensure through our own efforts that this calculation continues to obtain. But we feel that the choice of other means of advancing Soviet aims will be regulated only by tactical considerations which at the moment require an appearance of reasonableness and conciliation, with the notable exception of their treatment of the Berlin issue and the Federal Republic.

Khrushchev may see in the summit a device for concrete expression of what the Soviets believe to have been an important shift in the world-power relationship -- this would apply specifically to Berlin and to other topics connected with Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe. He also clearly considers it a podium for the projection of the image of a peaceful and progressive Soviet Union and of the Communist program of "peaceful coexistence," which is designed to assist Soviet penetration of non-Communist areas, to turn neutral opinion against Western policy, and in time to weaken and divide opinion in the West itself. Finally, it is considered to be Khrushchev's aim to advance and consolidate his own personal position and that of his close supporters within the Soviet Union.

### 3. Over-All Western Aims

If this analysis can be shared, one aim of the Western leaders at the summit should be to demonstrate to the Soviet leaders and to world opinion through their attitude and the clarity and firmness with which they present Western positions that the Soviet analysis of the world-power relationship is incorrect and not accepted by us. The Western participants should make clear that they do not expect or anticipate the eventual success of the Communist system on a world-wide basis and impress on world opinion their confidence in the eventual world-wide prevalence of some form of general principles on which Western society is based.



Under the circumstances, we do not envisage any dramatic resolution of East-West differences at the summit. We should resist firmly specific Soviet pressures and efforts to expose points of difference among us while attempting to ascertain how far the Soviet Government is willing to go on specific, limited agreements of mutual benefit.

We would also hope to utilize the summit to make clear to world opinion, if possible through Khrushchev's own words, the actual significance

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of the Soviet push for "peaceful coexistence" and the nature of long-range Soviet aims, also preventing in this way the emergence of unrealistically favorable estimates of the present state and future course of East-West relations. At the same time, we hope to be able to disabuse Khrushchev of his disbelief in the durability of Western unity and to have some effect on his future thinking by making clear to him and to world opinion on this and subsequent occasions that there can be no real prospect of cooperation and peace among nations as long as the Soviet Union adheres to its expansionist aims. Thus we hope that the meeting will make some contribution to clearer world understanding of this major issue which divides East and West and to a long-range process of chipping away at the expansionist outlook of the Soviet leaders.

#### 4. Western Tactical Aims

Without anticipating to too great a degree the discussion of specific topics in ensuing meetings of the Foreign Ministers, it would be desirable in the first tripartite session to have a brief discussion of over-all Western tactical aims at the summit in order to provide perspective for the more detailed discussions on separate topics. The essence of our position can be simply stated: in the fields of disarmament and East-West relations, we do not feel that resolution of major differences can be expected but we intend to achieve whatever agreement is possible on limited specific questions. No progress toward solution of the German unity question is expected at the forthcoming meeting, but we will restate our position, adding to it certain features designed to gain more public understanding and support. On Berlin, we would hope either to achieve agreement on a *modus vivendi* close to the provisions of the Western proposal on Berlin of July 28, 1959 or on referral of the Berlin question to a subordinate group, with instructions to report to a subsequent summit meeting, possibly accompanying this action with a number of reciprocal declarations designed to reduce tensions over Berlin during the negotiations. Though no date would be mentioned if it could be avoided, we would hope that this subsequent meeting would not take place earlier than the fall of 1961, following the German elections. Which of these objectives should be stressed depends on a tactical evaluation which can only be made at the summit itself.

#### 5. Specific Summit Topics

This section contains a brief review of our position on the three principal summit topics and differences of opinion on these subjects with our allies which should if possible be resolved during the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. It could provide the basis for a summary review of overall summit strategy in the tripartite and subsequent sessions.

##### a. Disarmament. (Primarily for use in the Five-Power discussions.)

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The report of the Five Disarmament Representatives appears satisfactory under prevailing circumstances. As the report indicates, we continue to differ with the French on their desire to have a massive reconversion of stocks of nuclear weapons at an early stage, nor do we fully share the French view that armaments retained in early stages by national armed forces would bear a precise relationship to force levels. However, we do not believe that these questions are now acute enough to justify an important effort to resolve them in the Foreign Ministers session on disarmament, which it is believed should be used to discuss pre-summit tactics on disarmament and handling of disarmament at the summit.



(1) Pre-Summit Tactics on Disarmament. (Primarily for discussion in Five-Power meeting.) If the Soviets continue to insist that we agree on their version of general and complete disarmament, we should continue to insist that the Khrushchev proposals are not a practical means of reaching that goal. If the Soviets switch tactics to partial measures, we should welcome this as a more businesslike approach. We should use the time before the summit to improve our public posture on the two main points that we support general and complete disarmament of national military establishments through balanced, phased, and safeguarded agreements with concurrent strengthening of international machinery for maintaining peace and that we are willing to tackle the question in any one of a series of important beginning measures.

We also wish to use discussion of disarmament by the Foreign Ministers to make clear continued U.S. support of the UN and its charter responsibility to assist in the maintenance of international peace and security, mainly by supporting the idea of placing the International Disarmament Organization in the UN framework and by having the UN rather than the Ten-Nation Group carry out the joint studies mentioned in the Western plan on international peace-keeping machinery.

(2) Disarmament at the Summit. (For discussion in Tripartite and Five-Power meetings.) Our final plans will of course depend on the further course of the developments during the next month. We would wish at the outset of summit discussion of disarmament to define the major existing differences of approach to disarmament, justifying the practical Western approach to inspection and control in the light of technological advances. We would also like to have ready a number of specific proposals for presentation at the summit. The possibilities include proposals on prior notification of launching of missiles, satellites, and outer space vehicles, and our proposal that no weapons of mass destruction shall be stationed in outer space. We believe the heads of government may issue a

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general pronouncement on the ultimate goal of disarmament and request the Ten-Nation Conference to move forward to specific measures as rapidly as possible; we would prefer to stay away from an agreement on the broad principles of disarmament, though there are indications that this will be a Soviet goal at the summit. The Foreign Ministers may wish to give instructions on further preparations of these topics.

A second question, which might be discussed in the tripartite meeting with the French and British, is how the prospect of substantive agreement on disarmament, including the specific limited steps mentioned above and the prospect of an agreement on nuclear testing can be exploited at the summit for their maximum negotiating advantage as applied to the most difficult of the summit problems, that of Berlin. Though they continue to differ from us on nuclear testing itself, the French have indicated in the Four-Power Working Group their belief that the Western powers should at the summit itself make some sort of connection between progress on disarmament and the Berlin issue as has already been done in public U.S. statements. It is obvious that we can make no formal or legal connection between the two subjects, but perhaps we can gain the agreement of the British and the tacit understanding of the French to the idea of a statement from the President to Khrushchev pointing out that, although summit discussion may bring agreement on nuclear testing closer, it would be quite illusory to expect that further difficulties on Berlin would not have an impact on the prospects of Senate ratification of any agreement on the subject.



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Consequently, it is believed that we should, for tactical reasons, first introduce the Western Peace Plan, amended by a plebiscite proposal, and follow it with a proposal for an all-Berlin solution. Assuming that Soviet agreement on these points is out of the question at this time, we should then aim either for agreement on the principles of a modus vivendi on Berlin which would not depart too far from the lines of the Western proposal of July 28, 1959, or for referral of the Berlin question to a subordinate group with instructions to report to a subsequent summit meeting. Which of these objectives should be stressed would depend on a tactical evaluation which can only be made in the light of actual development at the summit. Both courses would entail continued negotiation, though from very different starting points.



In the event the second course is followed, it would be our expectation that continuation of the Soviet "peaceful coexistence" line in the interim may make it increasingly difficult for the Soviets to take unilateral action on Berlin without damaging the image they now wish to project to the outside world. The time thus gained would also be used both for an intensification of Berlin contingency planning among the Western powers for the event of unilateral Soviet action to change the status quo in Berlin, and for further continued review of the Western and Soviet positions in order to determine if changes can or should be made in the Western position.

A secondary Western aim in following this course, assuming that the West has advanced plausible proposals for referral of the Berlin question to experts which would provide political grounds for Soviet agreement if the U.S.S.R. so desired, would be to use the referral proposal as a revealing index of Soviet readiness at this stage to abstain from the use of pressure tactics and threats of force to pursue their aims both in Berlin and elsewhere; if the Soviets categorically refuse further negotiation on the Berlin question except on the basis of unacceptable Western concessions of substance, this should presumably be regarded as a general danger signal.

There are a limited number of open questions on Germany and Berlin mainly of a tactical nature which would be dealt with in the Quadripartite session on this subject and which are described in a separate paper.

c. East-West Relations. (Primarily for discussion in Tripartite meeting with Spain.) In spite of British and American efforts to show

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the risks and difficulties of this course, the French continue to have a far more ambitious conception of this subject than we, apparently hoping for progress on a number of subjects which past experience has taught us are not of a type on which meaningful agreement with the Soviets can be reached. Specifically, they wish to advance for Soviet acceptance a set of mutually agreed principles for the conduct of world affairs. They also wish an agreement which would prohibit political "interference" in certain areas of Africa and the Near East and an agreement placing limitations on the shipment of arms to the same areas. Finally, they wish to suggest to the Soviets the idea of cooperation on joint projects for economic aid to underdeveloped areas.

We feel it might be desirable for the Western powers to work out their own principles to govern the relationship between states primarily for use as rebuttal material in debate to counter Khrushchev's theory of "peaceful coexistence" rather than as a basis for agreement with the Soviets. However, we have consistently opposed the French objectives as unrealistic and in some respects risky, and we believe we should utilize the Foreign Ministers meeting if possible to bring the different positions closer, though it would appear unrealistic to expect the French to entirely abandon the contested projects since de Gaulle has already personally told Khrushchev of his intention to raise at least some of them at the summit. We believe we can count on a certain degree of support from the British on these open questions, which are further described in the position paper on East-West Relations. In spite of existing differences, it is believed possible to gain the agreement of the British and French, and of Spaak as representative of NATO, to the definition of East-West objectives set out below:



We would hope to influence discussions of East-West relations to make clear the true meaning and significance of "peaceful coexistence" to world opinion and to establish an easily understandable statement of the Western conception of a constructive relationship among states. We hope to avoid becoming involved in a morass of dialectic argument on the Soviet version of non-interference or to agree to any formulation which might be interpreted as acceptance of the status quo in the bloc. We would instead aim for agreement on whatever limited, specific topics such as East-West exchanges as may be possible, while recognizing that most subjects falling under this heading lend themselves best to bilateral negotiation.

Our principal tactic might be to confront Khrushchev with specific points in response to his generalities. When he speaks of

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"coexistence," we should introduce a clear definition of what the Soviets mean by this; if he speaks of cultural exchanges, we should seek to gain favorable resolution of outstanding difficulties in this field and that of exchange of books and printed material. With regard to arms deliveries, we should, in private discussions with Khrushchev, urge mutual restraint in deliveries to areas where these deliveries might intensify conflicts, e.g., the Arab states and Israel, and be prepared -- in place of the French proposal -- to accept a statement by the summit powers that they would conform their arms deliveries to any regional arms control arrangements that might be arrived at by the countries concerned. An effort should be made to achieve results which are concrete and which if they are innovations have the appearance of limited experiments rather than the beginning of a "new era" in East-West relations.



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